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Abstract 
 
Nostalgia and food are intertwined universals in human experience. All of us have 
experienced nostalgia centered on food, and all of us have experienced food infused with 
nostalgia. To explore the links between nostalgia and food, I start with a rough taxonomy 
of nostalgic foods, and illustrate it with examples. Despite their diversity, I argue that there 
is a psychological commonality to experiencing nostalgic foods of all kinds: imagination. 
On my account, imagination is the key to understanding the cognitive, conative, affective, 
and perceptual aspects of experiencing nostalgic foods. In turn, the recognition of 
imagination’s centrality in experiencing nostalgic foods reveals how food can produce 
aesthetic experiences comparable to those produced by literature and painting. 
 
What is a food that makes you nostalgic?  
For me, it is lóo-bah-pn̄g (braised pork rice) from a particular eatery near my 
home in Taiwan. When I was in elementary school, my parents were both working 
and busy. So while many other kids had homemade leftovers for lunch, mine would 
often be this particular eatery’s lóo-bah-pn̄g. It became the center of my nostalgia for 
that period, for my childhood, for a place that I still consider my home. In turn, my 
present-day aesthetic experiences of eating the lóo-bah-pn̄g from the same eatery are 
inevitably infused with nostalgia. In fact, every time I return to Taiwan I still go back 
to the same eatery in an unquestionably quixotic attempt to again experience that 
lóo-bah-pn̄g that exists in my mind, even though the ones that I experience in the 
present somehow never smell or taste quite the same. 
Despite person-to-person variations in the details, I think the core of my 
aesthetic experience with nostalgic food is likely to resonate with other people. In 
nearly every language, there is a word that corresponds to the English “nostalgia” 
that tracks the idea of a backward-looking longing (Gotlib 2018). And, across 
different contexts, food persists as a central force in the formation of cultural—as 
well as personal—identities. It is no surprise that nostalgia and food are intertwined 
universals in human experience (Gotlib 2018; Locher et al 2015). All of us have 
experienced nostalgia centered on food, and all of us have experienced food infused 
with nostalgia. 
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To explore the links between nostalgia and food, I start with a rough taxonomy 
of nostalgic foods, and illustrate it with examples (§1). Drawing on contemporary 
cognitive science of nostalgia, I argue that there is a psychological commonality to 
experiencing nostalgic foods of all kinds: imagination (§2). On my account, 
imagination is the key to understanding the cognitive, conative, affective, and 
perceptual aspects of experiencing nostalgic foods (§3). In turn, the recognition of 
imagination’s centrality in experiencing nostalgic foods reveals how food can 
produce aesthetic experiences comparable to those produced by literature and 
painting (§4). 
 
1. Varieties of Nostalgic Foods 
 
In the academic study of nostalgia, there is a common distinction between 
“personal” versus “historical” varieties (Havlena & Holak 1991; Holak & Havelena 
1992; Stern 1992). For example, Barbara J. Stern characterizes personal nostalgia as 
being about “the way I was” and historical nostalgia as being about “the way it was” 
(1992: 13–16). We can use this distinction to start to build a rough taxonomy of 
nostalgic foods (§1.1 and §1.2), before considering the similarities and differences 
between different types of nostalgic foods (§1.3). 
 
1.1. Personally-Nostalgic Foods 
 
Personally-nostalgic foods are the ones that came to mind when I asked “what is 
a food that makes you nostalgic?”. Following Stern’s distinction, these are foods that 
correspond to the way you were. Since each personally-nostalgic food is born from 
each individual’s personally-important experience, there is predictably much 
interpersonal variance when it comes to personally-nostalgic foods. I am personally 
nostalgic for lóo-bah-pn̄g, but you are probably not.  
A particularly interesting example of personally-nostalgic food comes from 
performance artist Marina Abramović, in the form of a macaron that “tastes of her” 
(compare Korsmeyer 2019). As Abramović describes the flavors in a press release: 
 
My grandmother, early morning, making coffee. She never trusted anybody to 
buy ready coffee, she would buy the green beans and then burn them herself, the 
smell of coffee was everywhere in the house. Then I remember the smells of 
fresh basil, thyme, cardamom seeds, and exotic smells from the trips I took later 
on and remember exploring volcanoes and waterfalls and remember this feeling 
in the early morning when I see the line of the sea just meet the ocean, and 
ocean meet the sky. All of this, in this macaron of me. (Rea 2017) 
 
Despite Abramović’s commercialization of her macaron, it remains distinctively a 
personally-nostalgic food. While the combination of smells and tastes presumably 
evokes nostalgia for Abramović herself, due to her association of them with 
personally-important experiences, they presumably cannot evoke nostalgia for 
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anyone else. Indeed, her macaron only promises consumers a taste of Marina 
Abramović, not a taste of their own childhoods. 
 
1.2. Historically-Nostalgic Foods 
 
Historically-nostalgic foods, by contrast, have the social function of evoking 
nostalgia. Following Stern’s distinction, these are foods that relate to the way it was—
where that “it” can be a historical period, a cultural background, or even a 
developmental stage that is shared and significant. For example, in Taiwan it is 
common to find food marketed as kóo-tsá-bī (traditional-tasting, or literally “taste of 
old”). Typically, a kóo-tsá-bī food is representative of an important intersection 
between culture and history. For example, despite the use of a new world crop, han-
tsî-muê (sweet potato congee) has become interwoven into Taiwanese identity via a 
culinary tradition that is thought to be distinctively Taiwanese, and an association 
with the harsh material conditions of pre-economic-development eras in Taiwan’s 
history (Chang 2013). It is this connection to identity construction that allows 
historically-nostalgic foods to evoking nostalgia as its social function.  
Given the variety of things that can be “it” in “the way it was”, however, the 
category of historically-nostalgic foods can be further divided into two sub-
categories: intentionally-designed versus culturally-emergent. 
A particularly interesting example of intentionally-designed historically-
nostalgic food comes from the Chicago modernist restaurant Next, in the form of its 
Childhood tasting menu, which ran from October 2011 to January 2012. Phil Vettel 
offers one particular interpretation of, and a way to appreciate, the opening course in 
his review in Chicago Tribune: 
 
As the meal begins, you’re confronted by three cocktail glasses, containing an 
olive, cherry and bit of celery, respectively, along with a corresponding 
tablespoon’s worth of Martini, Manhattan and Bloody Mary. I actually waited 
for the glasses to be filled before a waiter informed me that presentation was 
complete, and then I caught on — the presentation mimicked the sip-of-dad’s-
cocktail experience. Ideally, one would accompany each sip with a furtive, over-
the-shoulder glance. (Vettel 2011) 
 
As the name of the tasting menu indicates, this course is intentionally designed to 
evoke childhood nostalgia. However, the success of the three-cocktails course lies in 
its ability to evoke nostalgia for a wide variety of consumers coming from different 
times and places. Even though this course is like personally-nostalgic foods insofar 
as it is associated with personally-important experiences, it is also unlike personally-
nostalgic foods insofar as it is not specific to any individual. Instead, if Vettel’s 
response is indicative, the three-cocktails course is aesthetically impressive because it 
is able to evoke a kind of nostalgia that is about, and associated with, a common 
developmental stage. We can readily recognize the infusion of nostalgia in this 
course by considering a counterfactual: if nostalgia were not a central component of 
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the aesthetic experience of this course, then it would be no more than three stingy 
servings of familiar cocktails, which would be rather aesthetically unimpressive. 
 However, not all historically-nostalgic foods are creations of gastronomy 
geniuses or marketing machines. Quite often, as is the case with kóo-tsá-bī foods of 
Taiwan, they are about, and associated with, particular eras of particular cultures. 
While these foods can in principle be consumed and enjoyed by themselves, 
nostalgia does seem central to the aesthetic experiences that they afford, even for 
present-day consumers who have not personally experienced the historical and 
cultural background referenced. For example, while consumers might not eat dried 
sweet potatoes otherwise, they might eat it as a part of han-tsî-muê because it is 
infused with historical nostalgia. 
A particularly interesting example of culturally-emergent historically-nostalgic 
food comes from the use of canned red tomatoes, as opposed to the traditional 
pickled green tomatoes, in Georgian cuisine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
(Dunn 2008). During the fourth and fifth Five Year Plans, the Soviet Union invested 
heavily in industrial canned food production in Georgia, and in turn canned fruits 
and vegetables became central to Georgian cuisine. So when industrial canned foods 
became unavailable after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, many Georgians 
turned to home-canned fruits and tomatoes in their search for these historically-
nostalgic foods, which resulted in hyperendemic botulism across the country. As 
Elizabeth Cullen Dunn argues in her anthropological case study: 
 
[…] botulism is, first of all, the product of a locally specific nostalgia, dietary 
desires evoked by a state that no longer exists. People who want canned red 
tomatoes are harkening back to the taste of the Soviet empire, to a world in 
which an industrial state provided food to its citizen-consumers as a way of 
linking them to the body politic. The yearning for red tomatoes thus is not just a 
longing for vegetables, no matter how tasty, but a culturally and historically 
specific longing for a lifeworld that was predictable (even if it was predictably 
awful), a state whose existence one could perceive in the material objects of daily 
life, and a regulatory environment that provided a measure of physical safety 
and existential security that no longer obtains (Dunn 2008: 254) 
 
The use of canned red tomatoes clearly has the social function of evoking nostalgia 
for a wide variety of individuals. On Dunn’s analysis, post-Soviet Georgians’ 
nostalgia for canned red tomatoes includes representationally-rich associations of 
canned red tomatoes with a predictable and predictably awful Soviet state, 
complicated and nuanced emotional responses, and a desire that is so great that they 
literally risk dying for it. 
 
1.3. Differences and Similarities 
 
The foregoing taxonomy is useful because it shows us a variety of nostalgic 
foods, with some (hopefully) memorable exemplars. However, it is only one way to 
recognize the diversity of nostalgic foods. For one, the categories are not mutually 
exclusive: for example, there are historically-nostalgic foods that are also some 
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people’s personally-nostalgic foods. For another, there exist other notable 
dimensions of variation. First, nostalgic foods only partially overlaps with comfort 
foods: some comfort foods are not nostalgic foods, such as indulgence foods and 
convenience foods (Locher et al 2005); and some nostalgic foods are not comfort 
foods, such as Abramović’s macarons. Second, some nostalgic foods are essentially 
intertwined with culturally and historically bound notions of culinary authenticity 
(Strohl 2019; see also papers collected in Korsmeyer 2016, Part VIII), such as 
Taiwanese han-tsî-muê and Georgian canned red tomatoes, but others stand 
independently of such notions, such as Next’s three-cocktails course. 
Nevertheless, I contend that there is something significant that is common to 
experiencing nostalgic foods of all kinds. We have to acknowledge the messiness of 
social reality to avoid reductive explanations, but we also have to not lose sight of the 
meaningful universality of experiencing nostalgic foods. Despite the variations, there 
exist psychological commonalities to experiencing nostalgic foods, whether it is my 
experiencing a personally-nostalgic lóo-bah-pn̄g, my experiencing a historically-
nostalgic han-tsî-muê, or my experiencing Next’s historically-nostalgic three 
cocktails. 
There are multiple aspects to the psychological profile of experiencing nostalgic 
foods. Cognitively, it involves representations of a subjective past, which may be 
more or less idealized, or even fictional. As Stern puts it, “Just as historical nostalgia 
idealizes the imaginatively recreated past, so too does personal nostalgia idealize the 
personally remembered past” (1992: 16). Conatively, it involves a backward-looking 
longing. Affectively, it involves a bittersweet feeling that mixes a positive valence 
toward the subjective past and a negative valence toward the incongruence between 
the past and the present. Perceptually, it involves smells and tastes that are modified 
or modulated by the aforementioned cognitive, conative, and affective states. To 
better understand each of these aspects, we now turn to the cognitive science of 
nostalgia in general.  
 
2. Cognitive Science of Nostalgia 
 
Traditionally, nostalgia was pathologized and medicalized as a mental illness, 
rather than being recognized as just another aspect of our complex mental lives. On 
the traditional conception of nostalgia, the cognitive component consists of the 
retrieval of autobiographical memories of one’s home; the affective component 
consists of only negatively-valenced emotions; and the conative component consists 
of a desire to return to one’s homeland. Against this traditional conception, Felipe 
De Brigard synthesizes recent empirical research on memory to propose a modern 
conception of nostalgia. 
 It is central to De Brigard’s modern conception that the cognitive component 
of nostalgia consists of a wide variety of mental simulation. While retrieval of 
autobiographical memory of one’s home is one kind of mental simulation, there are 
many other kinds that can take its place in nostalgic episodes. First, even when 
nostalgia includes autobiographical memories, they need not be about one’s home; 
instead, they can be about one’s childhood, family, or even something as general as 
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“the way people were” (Batcho 2013; cited in De Brigard 2018: 159). Second, even 
when nostalgia includes memories of the past, the memories need not be episodic—
that is, they need not be about specific events; instead, they can be about social 
relationships or one’s childhood (Hepper et al. 2012, 2014; cited in De Brigard 2018: 
159). Third, nostalgia can include mental simulations that are about a past that one 
never personally experienced; for example, a teenager today who is very into post-
punk might feel intensely nostalgic about the 1980s scene (De Brigard 2018: 160–
161). In fact, the mental simulations can also be about a possible past, a possible 
present, or even a possible future (De Brigard 2018: 162). To sum up, on the modern 
conception, while the cognitive component of nostalgia can be constituted by 
memory in a narrow autobiographical sense, it can also be constituted by other types 
of mental simulation. 
 This expanded conception of the cognitive component of nostalgia fits with, 
and indeed arises from, an expanded conception of memory that has emerged from 
recent cognitive science. The traditional preservationist conception of memory is 
that it operates like an archive: information is simply encoded, stored, preserved, and 
retrieved. However, recent cognitive science has challenged this traditional 
conception in favor of a constructivist conception of memory, on which 
remembering is “an active process in which the subject constructs a more or less 
adequate representation of the past” (Michaelian & Sutton 2017). The constructivist 
conception of memory is more expansive insofar as it weakens or omits 
requirements on veracity and causal connection. That is, depending on the specific 
theory, remembering may not require the subject to represent perfectly accurately in 
all respects, and remembering may not require an appropriate causal connection 
between the subject’s representation and their original experience.  
On the constructivist conception of memory, there is a psychological 
continuity between remembering and imagining (De Brigard 2014; Hopkins 2018; 
Michaelian 2016, 2018; Shanton and Goldman 2010; but see also Debus 2014, 2016, 
2018 and Robins forthcoming; see Liao and Gendler 2019, sec. 2.4, for an overview). 
Of course, the subject may still metacognitively label some outputs as “memories” 
and others as “imaginings”, but the crucial claim is that the outputs are generated by 
the same set of psychological processes (Michaelian 2016; Debus 2018). Different 
theorists give different labels to this set of psychological processes: “mental time 
travel” (Michaelian 2016; Schachter, Addis, & Buckner 2007), “mental simulation” 
(De Brigard 2014, 2018), or simply “imagination” (Michaelian 2018). I am most 
sympathetic to that last label, according to which “the common overarching capacity 
is imagination … divide into episodic and semantic types” (Michaelian 2018: 102). 
That is, the mental states that we typically label as “memories” are imaginings of a 
specific sort: past-directed imaginings. Specifically, the phrase “past-directed” is 
intended to encode the subjective temporal dimension of memories—that they 
present to the subject as looking back to the past—but without a commitment to the 
now-controversial veracity or causal connection requirements. From this more 
general account of memory as past-directed imaginings, we can tweak De Brigard’s 
account and say that the cognitive component of nostalgia is constituted by 
imaginings, especially past-directed imaginings. 
 7 
 De Brigard’s modern conception of nostalgia also reconceptualizes the affective 
and conative components. The affective component, as recent social psychological 
research has shown, consists of both positively- and negatively-valenced emotions 
(De Brigard 2018: 163–165; see also Hepper et al. 2012 and Sedikides & Wildschu 
2016). Specifically, this mixed-valenced affective response comes from the fact that 
nostalgic episodes are at once about the past and the present. So they 
characteristically include a positively-valenced emotion evoked by past-directed 
imaginings but also a negatively-valenced emotion evoked by the incongruence 
between the context of the imagined past and the context of the experienced present. 
In turn, the conative component of nostalgia consists of a desire to resolve this 
incongruence (De Brigard 2018: 169–170; compare Gotlib 2018). For example, the 
desire might involve a motivation to make the present like the (imagined) past, so 
that the positively-valenced emotion evoked by past-directed imaginings can be 
made real. 
 
3. Experiencing Nostalgic Foods 
 
The cognitive science of nostalgia points to an imaginative account of 
experiencing nostalgic foods. To fill out this imaginative account, I will turn to 
Kendall Walton’s influential account of the role of imagination in games of make-
believe (§3.1). My proposal, in brief, is that nostalgic foods are props for our games 
of make-believe. Some of these, such as our peculiar esoteric nostalgic foods, only 
prompt us to games of our own. But others, such as those that have the social 
function of evoking nostalgia, prompt us to games that we share with people of a 
similar culture, a similar history, or a similar age group. Then, I will return to Felipe 
de Brigard’s account of nostalgia to elucidate the cognitive (§3.2), as well as the 
affective and conative (§3.3) aspects of experiencing nostalgic foods. Finally, I will 
explain the role of imagination in the perceptual aspect of experiencing nostalgic 
foods (§3.4). 
 
3.1. Walton on Make-Believe  
 
 One of Walton’s key insights is that there is a continuity between children’s 
games of make-believe and representational arts like literature and painting—
namely, their use of props (1990: 35–43). When a child takes a toy phone and 
pretends to make a call, the toy phone functions as a prop for the child’s make-
believe: it prescribes particular imaginings—such as the child is making a phone 
call—for participants of the game. Representational arts like literature and painting 
are similar to a toy phone in this crucial respect: they too prescribe particular 
imaginings for their audiences, whose engagement with them constitute a game of 
make-believe. In other words, toy phones and paintings alike are props that have the 
social function of being appreciated via imaginings. As Walton notes, the nature of 
these imaginings can vary: they can be spontaneous or deliberate, occurrent or non-
occurrent, and solitary or social (1990: 13–19). 
 Walton distinguishes two kinds of worlds that associated with make-believe 
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games (1990: 57–63). Game worlds are the worlds of each imaginer. Work worlds are 
the worlds prescribed by the prop. Toy phones and paintings come with work 
worlds, which can be more or less specific, insofar as they prescribe particular 
imaginings. In using these props in their make-believe games, each imaginer (or 
each group of joint-imaginers) creates a game world that more or less aim at the 
work world: they follow the imagination prescriptions to various degrees, and 
sometimes add details or extensions of their own where the work world lacks 
specificity. So the child playing with a toy phone can start by pretending to make a 
call and then imagine a story of their own telling, and similarly the viewer 
appreciating a painting can start by picturing the scene depicted and imagine a world 
that goes beyond the surface. 
 
3.2. Cognition of Nostalgic Foods 
 
 As mentioned before, one motivation for an imaginative account of 
experiencing nostalgic foods comes straightforwardly from the cognitive science of 
nostalgia, on which imagination is central to nostalgic episodes in general. However, 
another motivation for an imaginative account of experiencing nostalgic foods 
comes from the phenomenology, or subjective character, of experiencing nostalgic 
foods. 
 At the start, I talked about the nostalgia evoked by the lóo-bah-pn̄g from a 
particular eatery near my home in Taiwan. However, there were two crucial bits of 
phenomenological detail that are left out from my initial description. First, while my 
nostalgic episode is specific in some ways, it is general in others. The nostalgia 
evoked by that lóo-bah-pn̄g is about a relatively imprecise time, my childhood, and a 
relatively imprecise place, my home. Second, given the imprecisions, I am frankly 
uncertain how true my descriptions are. For all I know, I do not really know how 
often my parents brought me to take out lóo-bah-pn̄g for my school lunch; I 
remember it as a nearly daily routine, but it could have only happened a couple of 
times. Importantly, I do not really care about the veracity of my descriptions; even if 
I were wrong, it would make no difference to my nostalgia. That is, at least 
phenomenologically speaking, experiencing nostalgic foods seems indifferent to 
specificity and veridicality. 
 The imaginative account can explain these puzzling phenomenological features 
of experiencing nostalgic foods. First, the worlds of our imagination standardly vary 
in their specificity. We might imagine a very specific castle when we read a fairytale, 
or we might just be imagining a castle generically. Thinking of food-related nostalgia 
as involving past-directed imaginings means that our representations need not 
always be about specific events, but instead about something more general—like 
one’s childhood, family, or even something as general as “the way people were”. 
Second, the worlds of our imagination standardly vary in their fidelity to reality. 
While similarity to reality is a default principle that guides our imaginings, it is also 
one that can be overridden (Friend 2017). Thinking of food-related nostalgia as 
involving past-directed imaginings explains why veridicality often seems to be beside 
the point. Since our experiences of nostalgic foods are standardly centered on past-
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directed imaginings, it therefore unsurprising that they have these two subjective 
characters.  
 We can now apply Walton’s account of make-believe to explicate the 
experiences of nostalgic foods. Specifically, I will start with experiences of 
personally-nostalgic foods, in the hopes that they are more readily recognizable, 
before extending the account to experiences of historically-nostalgic foods. When I 
eat lóo-bah-pn̄g now, I create a game world about a personally-important experience. 
As Walton notes, my imaginings might well be spontaneous and non-occurrent. 
Some of my imaginings are about specific things, such as the lóo-bah-pn̄g of my 
past—maybe real, maybe idealized, or maybe even fictional.1 Other imaginings are 
more like general impressions, such as ones about my childhood and my home. 
Again, these past-directed imaginings do not come with the presuppositions of 
veracity or appropriate causal connections to past experiences. 
 The same cognitive profile applies to experiences of historically-nostalgic 
foods. Given that historically-nostalgic foods have the social function of evoking 
nostalgia, by being appreciated via past-directed imaginings, the game worlds we 
create do aim at work worlds. We can return to Dunn’s anthropological case study to 
give an example of how imagination works in the cases of culturally-emergent 
historically-nostalgic foods. When Georgians experienced those homemade canned 
red tomatoes, they participated in the make-believe of “a lifeworld that was 
predictable (even if it was predictably awful)” (Dunn 2008: 254). Parts of the make-
believe might be specific—perhaps moments of consuming food made with 
industrially canned red tomatoes during the Soviet era—and other parts of the 
make-believe might be general—such as a sense of “physical safety and existential 
security that no longer obtains” (Dunn 2008: 254). Similarly, we can return to 
Vettel’s review of Next’s three-cocktails course to give an example of how 
imagination works in the cases of intentionally-designed historically-nostalgic foods. 
When Vettel experienced the course, he participated in the make-believe prescribed: 
a coming-of-age experience of sipping dad’s cocktail. 
 
3.3. Affect and Conation of Nostalgic Foods 
 
 As is the case with nostalgic episodes in general, experiencing nostalgic foods 
evoke mixed-valenced emotional responses that are, in part, driven by a desire to 
resolve the incongruence between the subjective past and present. Once again, let us 
start with experiences of personally-nostalgic foods before extending the account to 
experiences of historically-nostalgic foods. When I eat lóo-bah-pn̄g now, I have some 
positive feelings for the imagined past, and some negative feelings about the gap 
between that imagined past and the actual present. In particular, I am at once 
directing my emotions at both the lóo-bah-pn̄g that exists in my past-directed 
                                               
1 For convenience, I am presupposing that we can imagine objectually, such that imaginings can take an object as its 
content (Noordhof 2002). However, I am ultimately not committed to this ontology of imaginings. For example, my 
claim here can be recast in terms of events, such as the past events of my smelling, tasting, and eating lóo-bah-pn ̄g. 
Thanks to Ricardo Mena for discussion. 
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imaginings and the lóo-bah-pn̄g that I am presently consuming.2 That is, my positive 
feelings are about the lóo-bah-pn̄g in the game world, and my negative feelings are 
about the differences between those fictive objects and the actual one. Given the 
incongruence, there is an often unobtainable desire to reconcile the imagined past 
and the experienced present. As mentioned before, whenever I return to Taiwan, I 
am motivated by that quixotic desire to go back to the same eatery even though I 
know that the lóo-bah-pn̄g I consume now cannot be quite smell or taste like the one 
that I imagine.  
 The same affective and conative profile applies to experiences of historically-
nostalgic foods. Again, let us return to Dunn’s anthropological case study to 
illustrate the affect and conation of culturally-emergent historically-nostalgic foods. 
On her analysis, the post-Soviet Georgians not only desired the smell and taste of 
Georgian dishes developed during the Soviet era, they also desired the safety and 
authority of the state: “People’s desire for the state, complete with the cohesion of 
elements that gave it the appearance of unitary authority, was thus made manifest as 
they tried to replicate the taste of socialism” (Dunn 2008: 250). Although she does 
not explicitly discuss it, one suspects that there is a corresponding affective 
component as well: a feeling of security toward the past, and a fear of uncertainty 
toward the present. And again, let us return to Vettel’s review to illustrate the affect 
and conation of intentionally-designed historically-nostalgic foods. He makes the 
suggestive claim that “Ideally, one would accompany each sip with a furtive, over-
the-shoulder glance” (2011). There is a thrill that comes with an illicit coming-of-age 
drink that one can no longer obtain, no matter the technical expertise of the drink 
maker. And one might seek to experience that imagined past again, even though it is 
undoubtedly irreconcilable it is with the actual present. 
 It is worth emphasizing that, on my account, experiencing nostalgic foods 
involves emotions that are directed at the imaginary. Scott Alexander Howard makes 
this same point about what he calls Proustian nostalgia: “As we have seen, in self-
aware Proustian nostalgia for the bad, the fictional or aestheticized features of the 
memory are part of the intentional object of the emotion. But the more that the 
remembered past diverges from reality, the less the emotion’s standards of fittingness 
might be beholden to the actual past” (2012: 648). Indeed, Howard suggests a parallel 
between the affective aspect of nostalgia and the paradox of fiction, which is usually 
discussed in the context of representational arts like literature and painting. 
However, there is a crucial difference between us: while he thinks Proustian nostalgia 
is only a special case, I think his description of it is generally applicable because 
                                               
2 There is an adjacent philosophical issue on whether there is a fundamental difference between emotional 
responses to reality and emotional responses to make-believe. See Friend 2016 for an overview. Walton (1978, 1990, 
1997) famously argued that the latter constitute a distinct kind called “quasi-emotions”. This article is only 
committed to the claim that experiences with nostalgic food standardly include emotional responses to make-
believe, and does not take a stance on whether that emotional response is distinctive. Note that, even for the 
Waltonian, there are quasi-emotions that are directed at non-fictive contents, such as documentaries (Friend 2008). 
If our emotional responses to nostalgic food turned out to be quasi-emotions, then they would be comparable to our 
quasi-emotions toward documentaries and other non-fictive contents. Thanks to Hannah Kim and Alessandro 
Torza for their worries about complications with Walton’s quasi-emotions in this context. 
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imagination is central to all nostalgic episodes—including all experiences of 
nostalgic foods. 
 
3.4. Perception of Nostalgic Foods 
 
In articulating an imaginative account of nostalgic food, I have so far focused 
on the three psychological components identified by De Brigard’s modern 
conception of nostalgia: cognition, conation, and affect. But a full account of 
experiencing nostalgic food cannot ignore perception. After all, nostalgic food is 
something that we smell and taste. So I will articulate three possible—and by no 
means mutually exclusive—psychological mechanisms by which imagination can 
interact with perception (compare Korsmeyer 2019). 
First, imagination might influence perception directly via cognitive penetration. 
If cognitive penetration truly occurs (and it is highly debatable whether it does; see 
Stokes 2013), then the phenomenology and content of our percepts are causally-
sensitive to cognitive mental states like imaginings. For example, suppose that 
cognitive penetration can occur in the experience of nostalgic food. Then, the way 
that lóo-bah-pn̄g smells and tastes to me now can differ from the way it would have 
smelled and tasted to someone without a nostalgia like mine. That is, we would 
literally smell and taste the same lóo-bah-pn̄g differently. 
Second, imagination might also influence perception indirectly via expectation. 
As Carolyn Korsmeyer (2002) has articulated, our perceptual experiences with food 
are often shaped by our expectations. An alcoholic beverage that contains an insect 
larva might be perceived as delicious if it is taken to be mezcal, but perceived as 
disgusting if it is not. While these expectations are often the works of beliefs, they 
can be the works of imaginings too. In the expectation case, unlike in the cognitive 
penetration case, the respective bare sensations (or lower-level percepts) might 
remain the same while the overall perceptual experience (or higher-level percepts) 
significantly differ. This psychological mechanism might be especially suited to 
explain why nostalgic foods of the present often do not smell or taste the same as 
their counterparts in the imagined past. For example, as mentioned earlier, the same 
eatery’s lóo-bah-pn̄g never tastes quite like the ones I am nostalgic for. Since the 
eatery has not changed its recipe, the most plausible explanation says that the 
difference is not to be found in the way that it actually smells and tastes, but in my 
broader perceptual experience, which is inescapably shaped by my nostalgia. 
Third, imagination might blend with perception to create mixed 
representations. Robert Eamon Briscoe has introduced the notion of make-perceive 
to refer to hybrid experiences that involves “both a bottom-up, perceptual 
component and a top-down, imaginative component” (2018: 162; see also Briscoe 
2008). In these cases, the imaginings are projected onto, or “materially anchored”, to 
the percepts: for example, a sailor might perceive the particular locations of stars 
above the horizon and imagine their destination as being a particular distance away, 
beyond the horizon. In experiencing nostalgic food, we might do something similar. 
For example, when I consume lóo-bah-pn̄g now, I might project my imaginings, 
desires, and feelings about my childhood and home onto each bite. Quite literally, in 
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the mixed representation case, we can be said to be smelling and tasting the past, via 
our make-percepts, when we consume nostalgic food.  
 
4. Aesthetics of Nostalgic Foods 
 
 There is an ongoing debate concerning the artistic status of food (Meskin 
2013). Its central question, at least on one way of phrasing it, is whether food is art 
like literature and painting. I am not convinced that this is the most philosophically 
productive question to ask, especially given the ongoing debate about the concept of 
art itself (Liao, Meskin, and Knobe 2020). Instead, I want to turn to a nearby 
question: whether food can afford aesthetic experiences comparable to ones afforded 
by literature and painting.3 To start, I will review Elizabeth Telfer’s argument for 
answering this question negatively, which also serves as the basis of her position that 
food is only a minor art (§4.1). Then, I will return to the psychological profile of 
experiencing nostalgic foods to argue against Telfer (§4.2). 
 
4.1. Telfer on the Aesthetic Experience of Food 
 
Telfer argues that food is only a minor art because she wants to temper our 
expectations regarding the aesthetic experiences that food can afford: “We also need 
to find a middle way between two unsatisfactory attitudes to the aesthetic dimension 
of food: we must not be so heedless as to waste a satisfying kind of aesthetic 
experience, but not so precious as to expect more of it than it can give.” (1996: 60). 
She offers three independent reasons for why food cannot afford aesthetic 
experiences comparable to ones afforded by canonical arts such as literature and 
painting. 
First, food cannot have permanence. Major art must not be transient for two 
reasons: it has to be around long enough to be contemplated, and it has to have the 
chance to speak to different generations (Telfer 1996: 58). Since food is not around 
long enough to be contemplated, let alone around long enough to speak to different 
generations, it cannot be a major art. 
Second, food cannot have meaning. Major art tends to be representational 
because then it has the capacity to tell us something about the world and about 
ourselves (Telfer 1996: 59). Some non-representational arts, such as music, can still 
be meaningful because they manage to express emotions in themselves (Telfer 1996: 
59). However, food can only be a vehicle via which the cook expresses emotions. 
Since food cannot represent in the same way that fine arts can and cannot express 
emotion in itself, it cannot be a major art. 
                                               
3 Of course, there is also an ongoing debate about what makes an experience aesthetic (Shelley 2017: sec. 2.4). My 
original intention is to use the term ‘aesthetic experience’ in an intuitive and uncommitted sense, but it may turn out 
that—given the emphasis on psychological mechanisms—my account is friendlier to internalist theories, which 
locates the aesthetic in the experience itself and not in the object of the experience. It should also be said that with 
nostalgic (and other) foods, like with literature and painting, there can be a variety of other experiences, such as 
religious and political. In many cases, these experiences are simultaneous to, and in interaction with, the aesthetic 
experiences. However, the present exploration of nostalgic food focuses only on the aesthetic aspect. 
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Third, food cannot be moving. Major art can evoke significant emotional 
responses. While food can “elate us, invigorate us, startle us, excite us, cheer us with 
a kind of warmth and joy, [it] cannot shake us fundamentally in that way of which 
the symptoms are tears or a sensation almost of fear.” (Telfer 1996: 59). Since food 
cannot evoke significant emotional responses from the consumers, it cannot be a 
major art. 
Although Telfer does not explicitly define her taxonomy of major versus minor 
arts, her discussion suggests that it has two aspects. Most apparently, Telfer’s 
taxonomy seems to track a distinction in the Western canon between fine arts and 
other cultural achievements, which are variously called decorative arts, applied arts, 
or crafts. This distinction between different types of artistic and cultural 
achievements is itself a product of, and continues to reinforce, a hierarchy of senses 
in the Western canon, according to which sight and hearing—the senses of fine 
arts—are thought to be superior to smell, touch, and taste (Korsmeyer 1975). More 
substantively, Telfer’s taxonomy also tracks an alleged distinction between the 
aesthetic experiences that are afforded by different artistic and cultural 
achievements. Minor arts can only afford simple aesthetic experiences—without 
permanence, meaning, or movingness—and so they are, as a kind, aesthetically 
inferior. Telfer’s argument for food as a minor art, then, can be understood as 
justifying the traditional hierarchy by appeal to the aesthetic experience affordances 
of different artistic and cultural achievements. 
 
4.2. Response to Telfer 
 
While I am skeptical of each of Telfer’s three criteria for distinguishing major 
art from minor art, I will not directly argue against them. Instead, my argumentative 
strategy will be to show that, even if Telfer were right about all three criteria, food 
can still be a major art. While Telfer does not comprehensively categorize the arts 
into major versus minor, her discussions suggest that literature and painting are 
good examples of major art. So, my argumentative strategy will be to show that food 
can afford aesthetic experiences comparable to ones afforded by literature and 
painting. On my diagnosis, all of Telfer’s reasons for why food is only a minor art 
depend on the implicit assumption that the aesthetic experiences of food are 
primarily sensory.4 And it is this assumption that I want to challenge. The 
recognition of imagination’s centrality in experiencing food—as shown by the 
psychological profile of experiencing nostalgic foods—shows that, at its best, food 
can afford aesthetic experiences relevantly similar to recognized major arts such as 
literature and painting. 
I am certainly not the first to recognize the role of imagination in the aesthetic 
experience of food. Even though Korsmeyer (1999) seems to share Telfer’s view that 
food is only a minor art—“Culinary art can still be considered a minor or a 
decorative art, or perhaps a functional or applied art” (144)—she has also argued for 
                                               
4 Korsmeyer makes a similar remark in response to Telfer: “Yet food and works of art share significant features that 
are often overlooked if one focuses only on sensuous taste pleasure” (2002: 218). Korsmeyer’s diagnosis and mine, 
while not mutually-exclusive, have different emphases: hers is on symbolic meaning, and mine is on imagination. 
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imagination’s role in the aesthetic experience of food in her monograph on taste.5 
Korsmeyer writes, “Clearly the imagination plays a big role in what counts as 
appetizing, not only the olfactory, gustatory, and visual senses.” (1999: 175; cf. 91). 
Korsmeyer argues that imagination’s role is especially recognizable when we 
consider the practice of food science labs, which seek to—as much as possible—
quarantine tasters’ imaginings from their senses (1999: 91). Aaron Meskin 
(manuscript) explores imagination’s role in the aesthetic experience of food from the 
case of so-called “mock food”, such as imitation meat. I think that nostalgic foods 
provide yet another case for recognizing imagination’s role in the aesthetic 
experience of food, and it arguably has the advantage of being a more mundane and 
universal experience. 
First, Telfer thinks that food cannot be around long enough to be contemplated 
because she is focusing on the sensory experience of food. Once you eat it, you can 
no longer smell it or taste it. That is true, but you can still imagine it. Nostalgic food 
is anything but transient. Historically-nostalgic foods show that food can be around 
long enough to speak to different generations. For example, as a Taiwanese person 
who has not personally experienced the pre-economic-development eras, I can still 
imagine that past when I eat han-tsî-muê today. The same, one would expect, can be 
said of Georgians who have not personally experienced the Soviet era when they eat 
canned red tomatoes today. The power of these culturally-emergent historically-
nostalgic foods lies in their ability to exist in the past-directed imaginings across 
generations such that they become an integral piece of the respective cultural 
identities. Indeed, the marketing of such historically-nostalgic foods would be wholly 
unsuccessful if consumers could not have such past-directed imaginings. 
Second, Telfer thinks that food cannot be meaningful because rarely can 
meaning be directly gained from the senses, especially the so-called “lower” senses of 
smell, touch, and taste. Even if the traditional hierarchy of senses were true, 
historically-nostalgic foods can still function as props for make-believe, just like 
literature and painting. And so they can convey meaning through the same 
psychological mechanism: imaginings. When one reads Vittel’s vivid description of 
his own experience of Next’s three-cocktails course, it is difficult to maintain that 
food, even at its best, still cannot engage imagination to convey meaning in the same 
way that literature and painting can. 
Third, Telfer thinks that food cannot evoke significant emotional responses, at 
least ones that are directed at fictive objects, because senses alone are often not 
enough to do so. As many people can attest, however, personally-nostalgic foods can 
certainly move us in deep ways including tears and fears. But even historically-
nostalgic foods can do the same. Consider again Vettel’s suggestion that each 
cocktail sip be accompanied by a furtive, over-the-shoulder glance. That nuanced 
                                               
5 This quote, admittedly, does not fully capture Korsmeyer’s complicated view on food and art. She does not think 
that the “art” label is particularly important. Moreover, she worries that the attempt to group all cultural 
achievements under the “art” label might impoverish our understanding of cultural achievements such as food, given 
their different cultural roles. For example, the “art” label might make us focus too much on gourmet food rather 
than ordinary food. In Korsmeyer 1999, she explicitly and critically discusses Telfer’s reasons for why food is only a 
minor art (108–110). In Korsmeyer 2002, she notes that “Foods and their tastes may represent and express 
significance in a distinctively ‘aesthetic’ fashion” (218). 
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mix of fear and excitement is not only a fitting response, but central to the aesthetic 
experience. 
 So, contrary to Telfer, I say that nostalgic foods can afford aesthetic experiences 
that have permanence, meaning, and movingness. Of course, this claim does not 
commit me to say that every nostalgic food in fact offers such a significant aesthetic 
experience. For comparison, even though literature and painting can afford 
comparably significant aesthetic experiences, that is not to say that every work of 
those kinds does. 
 Still, one might worry that the make-believe worlds associated with nostalgic 
foods—even historically-nostalgic foods—are too minimal to ground aesthetic 
significance. After all, it is unlikely that every Georgian person experiences canned 
red tomatoes as Dunn describes, and it is unlikely that every Next patron experiences 
the three-cocktails course as Vettel describes. In response, it is worth returning to 
literature and painting as our comparisons. With literature and painting, it is clear 
that minimal make-believe is no impediment to a work’s aesthetic significance. Of 
course it is possible that Vettel, as a food critic, is offering one esoteric and 
embellished interpretation of Next’s three-cocktails course. But similarly, one need 
not look too hard to find similarly esoteric and embellished interpretations from 
literary and visual art critics. In fact, arguably the best works are those that can 
afford multiple meanings and divergent emotional responses. As such, it is at least a 
possibility that the multiple meanings and divergent emotional responses that 
nostalgic foods afford actually adds to its aesthetic significance. 
 On the imaginative account of experiencing nostalgic foods, aesthetic 
experiences of food can be as significant as aesthetic experiences of literature and 
painting, even judged by Telfer’s three criteria. Nostalgic foods can stay with us, be 
meaningful to us, and move us. Indeed, it can do so not only throughout our 
individual lives, but also through generations and generations of our communities. It 
is thus no surprise that nostalgic foods play an important role in the construction of 
personal and cultural identities. What is the secret indispensable ingredient? 
Imagination.  
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